This paper presents a new data-driven fault identification and controller reconfiguration algorithm. The presented algorithm relies only on the system's input and output data, and it does not require a detailed system description. The proposed algorithm detects changes in the input-output behavior of the system, whether due to faults or malicious attacks and then reacts by reconfiguring the existing controller. This method does not identify the internal structure of the system nor the extent and nature of the attack; hence it can quickly react to faults and attacks. The proposed method can be readily applied to various applications without significant modifications or tuning, as demonstrated by the examples in the paper.
I. INTRODUCTION
Faults in a densely interconnected and tightly coupled network consisting of computation, communication and control components can lead to cascading effects disrupting the operation of the network. Modern dynamical systems should have the ability to restructure and adjust the control loop in the event of a fault. The nature and extent of faults in most cases are not predictable in advance, and considering all possibilities case by case in the design is not realistic. Designing a controller that is inherently fault-tolerant can also compromise the nominal performance. This study presents a data-driven method to detect a fault in the system through input and output data, without relying on a full system description, and then mitigating the effects of the fault through an adaptive controller reconfiguration.
Several methods exist to improve the response of a system to a fault. Fault-tolerant control deals with systems subjects to a fault (as opposed to classical control which only consider systems during normal operations). These methods are divided into "passive" approaches (not to be confused with passivitybased approaches) and "active" approaches. In the first category, the controller can handle faults without any changes (this includes robust control approaches). The type and the extent of the faults they can tolerate is limited, and they are designed to address different fault cases and nominal operation, resulting in suboptimal overall performance. A formal definition and examples are reported in [1] . The active approach, on the other hand, refers to designing strategies where a "re-design" or "reconfiguration" happens in response to the occurrence of the Department of Electrical Engineering, University of Notre Dame, USA. hzakeri@nd.edu, antsaklis.1@nd.edu
The partial support of ARO under Grant No. ARL W911NF-17-1-0072 is gratefully acknowledged. fault. These approaches either explicitly isolate and identify the fault, or the controller changes in response to the fault, but without explicitly identifying the fault. See [2] for an example and [3] for a review of different fault identification techniques.
Reconfigurable control refers to re-design or re-adjustment of the control algorithm to ensure safe operation of the dynamical system with some performance guarantees in the event of a fault [4] . This strategy has been studied via several approaches including fault hiding control [5] , [6] , model matching [7] , pseudo-inverse method (PIM) [8] , and model predictive control [9] . We also refer readers to [10] , [11] and the references therein for other reconfiguration approaches.
In this paper, we present a new fault identification method based on input and output data from the system. This method does not rely on a full detailed description of the system's behavior; therefore it can be readily applied to different applications. Since this method does not try to identify a detailed model for the system, it has the advantage of quick reaction to the fault. Based on this method, we also present an adaptive controller reconfiguration to mitigate the effects of the fault. The controller reconfiguration method does not try to design a new controller from scratch, but it relies on the existing controller in the system (relying on the existing controller is an essential criterion in many industrial applications) and mitigates the fault by interfacing the controller with a real matrix which is determined online. In other words, an interface is wrapped around the current controller to mitigate the effects of the fault. In this paper, we focus on describing this novel approach in detail, explaining how it can be applied in practice.
After the preliminaries in section II, we present the fault identification and mitigation method is section III. Even though the identification and control reconfiguration are presented as one algorithm, one can employ the identification process separately as well. Section IV presents examples of using this algorithm with simulation results. Conclusions and further directions are presented in section V. A more detailed version of this article is available online [12] .
II. PRELIMINARIES
Here we introduce the passivity indices of a system, and then we discuss stability results and a passivation method based on passivity indices. Consider a continuous-time dynamical system H : u → y, where u ∈ U ⊆ R m denotes the input and y ∈ Y ⊆ R p denotes the corresponding output. 
for all T > 0.
Passivity indices are introduced as measures of passivity and they extend passivity-based tools to non-passive systems as well.
Definition 2 (Input Feed-forward Passivity Index). The system H : u → y is called Input Feed-forward Passive (IFP) if, for every input u and the corresponding output y = Hu, we have
for all T > 0 and some ν ∈ R, denoted as IFP(ν). Input feed-forward passivity index for this system is the largest ν for which the system is IFP. 
for all T > 0 and some ρ ∈ R, denoted as OFP(ρ). Output feedback passivity index for this system is the largest ρ for which the system is OFP.
IFP index is equivalent to the largest gain that can be put in a negative feed-forward interconnection with the system such that the overall system is passive. OFP index is the largest gain that can be placed in positive feedback with a system such that the interconnected system is passive. If either one of the indices for a passive system is positive, we say that the system has an "excess of passivity," and similarly, if either one is negative, we say the system has a "shortage of passivity."
When applying the two indices simultaneously, a system is said to have IFP( ) and OFP(δ), or IF-OFP( , δ), based on the following dissipation inequality:
When = 0 and δ = 0 the passivity index condition reduces to the definition of passivity [13] . Passivity indices under operational limitations for nonlinear systems as well as approximate methods to find them are presented in [14] . For a local definition of passivity indices in nonlinear systems, see [15] .
A. Stability Properties
Lemma 1 ( [16] ). Consider the feedback interconnection of Figure 1 and suppose G and C have passivity indices (ν 1 , ρ 1 ) and (ν 2 , ρ 2 ) respectively. Then, the closed-loop map from
The above theorem assumes the validity of the feedback interconnection, i.e., both systems are square with the same number of inputs and outputs. When both systems under consideration (G and C) are linear, the conditions of the above lemma are relaxed to inequalities [17] (i.e., ρ 1 + ν 2 ≥ 0 and ρ 2 + ν 1 ≥ 0). For more information on passivity indices and their applications in Cyber-physical system design, see [18] , [19] .
B. Passivation and Design based on the M-matrix Method
Passivity indices can be adjusted by series, feedback, or parallel interconnections. A generalization of these methods is given in [20] by using an input-output transformation matrix. Appropriate design of this matrix, called the M-matrix, guarantees positive passivity levels for the system. 
where I is the identity matrix, and
It is shown in [20] that the passivity indices of the interconnection depend on the gain γ of system C and the elements of M, as stated in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 ([20]). Consider a finite gain stable system C with gain γ and a passivation matrix M as shown in Figure 2 . 
where 0 < a < 1 is an arbitrary real number. The algorithm looks at the input and output data from the system, namely u(t) and y(t), then derives estimatesρ andν of the passivity indices. These two estimates are then compared to set thresholds to detect whether there have been any significant changes to the system or not. The thresholds can be chosen close to the real indices of the system. If at least one of the estimated indices is lower than the threshold, and it has not been lower before, then the controller reconfiguration procedure will be initiated. The reconfiguration procedure involves the M -matrix discussed earlier. The reconfiguration will vary based on how both indices compare to the thresholds. If they are both lower, then the design objective would be to compensate for both of them; otherwise the reconfiguration will compensate for only one of them. It is important to note that we do not try to change the passivity indices of the plant but to make sure that the loop satisfies Lemma 1.
The algorithm is presented in Algorithm 1. In Algorithm 1, ρ andν are estimates of the indices, and the variables ρ min and ν min keep track of changes in the estimated indices. If any of the indices go below these thresholds, the reconfiguration matrix needs to be recomputed. Otherwise, the index has had a lower value, and the corresponding reconfiguration is still valid. Parameters ρ 0 and ν 0 are desired or safe values for the indices, and as long as the indices are not lower than these thresholds, the system is performing properly. These parameters are chosen by the designer based on any information that is available. They could be the actual (theoretical) values of the indices of the system, or they could be some thresholds just to hold conditions in Lemma 1. Onceρ andν go below thresholds ρ 0 and ν 0 , this indicates a malfunction in the system (more on this in the next section).
A. A Closer Look at the Estimation of the Passivity Indices
It is important to note that our goal here is not to derive precise estimates of the passivity indices. To do so, one requires to either excite the system with various inputs to achieve an upper bound for the indices (see [21] , [22] for a detailed discussion), or find the right kind of input that will lead to the actual indices or close to the actual indices (see [23] for example). However, both of these techniques are more suitable as offline methods. In the real-time estimation of the indices, one usually does not have the freedom to modify the input applied to the system.
The estimates can be represented as functions of timē 
If ρ and ν represent the actual indices of the system, based on the definition, the dissipation inequality should hold for all possible inputs. However,ρ andν correspond to a limited set of inputs to the system; therefore, we can bound them as
This is mainly because the definition of the indices implies a min-max optimization as
such that u y − y y holds (ν would be analogous). Therefore, for a particular input, our estimate is going to be greater or equal to the actual index. Here, in the proposed algorithm, the objective is not to precisely measure the system's passivity indices; rather, we use the estimatesρ andν as indicators of the system's operation: if they do not meet certain criteria, then it is an indication of a malfunction in the system. Integral Saturation and Overuse: If the system is running for a long time, there is a possibility that the integrators in (11) saturate overtime. Another possibility in longtime use is that t 0 u y dτ, t 0 y y dτ, and t 0 u u dτ might become very large, and a fault in the system would not be reflected by changes of a passivity index. One possible remedy is to either reset the integrators once in a while or integrate over a moving window; i.e., the lower limit of the integrals in (11) would be t − t 0 .
IV. EXAMPLES
In this section, we provide three different examples to demonstrate how this algorithm works. In each example, a nominal system is working in the loop with a controller. After sometime, a fault or attack happens in the system, which is modeled as a change in the dynamics of the system. The nominal dynamics, the nature of the change, and the new dynamics are unknown to the algorithm. In each example, the The first two examples are identical in the nominal operation and algorithm parameters. The same algorithm can handle different faults or attacks happening to the system. The first fault is modeled as a time-varying delay introduced to the system, and the second one is addition of nonlinear dynamics. It is worth noting that there are many methods to handle timevarying delays, and many methods to handle nonlinearities; however, they all need to be designed in advance for delay or nonlinearity, and they may compromise the design by being robust to the fault. In our presented method, there is no knowledge of what will happen in the system, and the algorithm will only reconfigure the controller if the nominal operation is compromised. The last example demonstrates a physical system with mass, damper, and spring, where the spring changes dynamics overtime.
A. Time Delay due to Actuator Failure or DoS Attacks
This numerical example demonstrates the effectiveness of the proposed method in identifying and then mitigating a malfunction where the fault is a time delay, which can model either an actuator fault or a Denial of Service (DoS) attack [24] . The system is running in nominal operation with its own controller in the loop. A delay is introduced in the system, and is gradually increased.
Consider the loop configuration of Figure 1 with r 2 ≡ 0. The nominal system is given as
and is controlled by a lead compensator C(s) = 1.37 s + 0.91 s + 1.08 (15) to satisfy some tracking objective. Under normal operation, the system is stable with adequate performance. A time-varying input delay τ (t), modeling a DoS attack or actuator failure, is introduced to the system starting at time t = 35. The delay gradually increases to reach the value of 0.5s at t = 40. With no further fault tolerant control in action, the loop will become unstable (the diverging output is not depicted here).
The proposed data-driven algorithm detects the fault in the system and reconfigure the controller in time by online design of the M matrix. At each time step, a new estimate is found, and if necessary, the reconfiguration matrix is recomputed. The algorithm keeps the loop stable, as shown by the output of the system in Figure 4 . The elements of the M -matrix are also depicted in Figure 5 . It can be seen that because of the freedom in designing M, some elements are chosen as constant and change based on the measurements. As can be seen in Figure 4 , the system output starts to diverge after t = 35, however the algorithm takes over around t = 40 and makes the system stable. The performance may not be ideal, but the role of the algorithm is to maintain stability quickly and with minimum knowledge of the system. Remark 1. There is a degree of freedom in the elements of the M -matrix, and it can be exploited to improve performance. See for example [25] . The direct relation of elements of M -matrix and different performance criteria is still an open question.
It is worth noting that the algorithm did not include the transfer function of either the system or the controller, nor is it based on the nature and specifics of the fault. 
B. Nonlinear Dynamics
Consider the system in (14) where now the fault is a change in the dynamics; namely the linear dynamics will suddenly become nonlinear (next example will illustrate a physical example of such a change). Also consider the same compensator in the loop. The system (14) can be written in state space form asẋ
At t = 40s, a fault happens in the system and the new dynamics will beẋ
The compensator will fail to keep the system stable; however, the proposed algorithm, with the same exact parameters and thresholds as the last case, maintains the stability of the loop with suitable performace. Figure 6 depicts the input and output of the closed-loop system when the algorithm is in operation. Without the fault mitigation algorithm, the system will be unstable.
C. Softening Spring
For an example of a physical system, consider a base-excited mass damper spring system. If there is an ideal linear spring in the system, the equation of motion can be written as with α < 0.
In this example, the linear system (with α = 0) is working with a lag compensator in the loop given as C = 4.8 s + 3.006 s + 2.485 with parameters m = 2, c = 3, and k = 10. At t = 40, the spring starts to soften, with α gradually reaching −1 at t = 50. The controller is not able to keep the system stable.
The Algorithm 1 is applied to the loop with ρ 0 = ν 0 = −0.15 and detects the change and maintains the stability of the system. The parameters ν 0 and ρ 0 are chosen as lower bounds for passivity indices of the nominal system. The input and output of the closed-loop system is depicted in Figure 7 . Even though the system does not have perfect tracking after the fault, the system remains stable and operational. It is a trade-off between performance and maintaining safety and stability of the system under unknown malfunctions and faults.
V. CONCLUSION In this paper, we presented some initial results of a new fault detection and adaptive controller reconfiguration algorithm. This method is based on the concept of passivity indices and relies only on the available data from input and output of the system. The presented method can detect changes in the system's behavior due to many factors including actuator faults and malicious attacks and can mitigate the fault or attacks by wrapping a reconfiguration matrix around the existing controller. The difference between this method and other adaptive method or fault detection methods is that we only calculate two parameters, implementation is easy, and calculations are simple. The algorithm has shown significant potential as demonstrated by different examples.
